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I. INTRODUCTION

The 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
(TRIPS)' was a stunning triumph for commercial interests and intellectual
property (IP) industry lobbyists who worked tirelessly to achieve the
global agreement. TRIPS institutionalized a conception of IP based on
protection and exclusion rather than competition and diffusion. After the
adoption of TRIPS within the World Trade Organization (WTO), two
major trends emerged: the vigilant monitoring and surveillance of TRIPS
compliance by IP industry representatives and civil society's increasingly
mobilized opposition to important aspects of TRIPS. This Article
examines the tension between the commercial and social agendas for IP in
the wake of TRIPS. I conclude that TRIPS represents the high water mark
of "hard law" for the commercial IP agenda in a multilateral context, and
that the momentum ofTRIPS protests, particularly in regard to patents, has
created a much more difficult political environment for the IP industry.
Since the adoption of TRIPS, American IP industry activists have
remained vigilant in monitoring the worldwide implementation and

* Prepared for the University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law Symposium:
IntellectualProperty, Development and Human Rights, March 24,2001. This Article draws from

my forthcoming book, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS.

1. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS -RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197(1994).
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compliance of TRIPS. They continue to avail themselves of the Special
301 apparatus to pressure developing countries into altering their domestic
IP policies. They also utilize the mechanisms of the WTO through the
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to file complaints over
TRIPS. At the same time, as the impact of TRIPS becomes more palpable,
new pockets of resistance and social mobilization have emerged to
challenge TRIPS. With the exception of initial resistance from developing
countries in moving IP issues from the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) to GATT, opposition to TRIPS emerged rather late
after the ink dried. This implies that while TRIPS cannot be undone in
any direct sense, fights over loopholes, alternative interpretations of vague
language, and perhaps, most importantly, effective resistance to further
multilateral expansion of global IP rights are on the horizon.
This Article first examines post-TRIPS IP industry strategies. It then
goes on to discuss two prominent opposition campaigns: agriculture and
plant varieties, and access to essential medicines, particularly in regard to
HIV/AIDS drugs. This Article then offers brief conclusions.
II. INDUSTRY STRATEGIES

Two important American lobbying groups played a major role in
drafting and insuring the adoption of TRIPS: the Intellectual Property
Committee (IPC), which consists of chief executive officers from a
handful of well-connected and economically powerful American-based
multinational corporations,2 and the International Intellectual Property
Alliance (IIPA), an umbrella lobbying group that represents eight trade
associations and over 1,500 companies whose products and services are
copyright-intensive. These private sector groups articulated three major
post-TRIPS strategies for the United States: (1) the selective use of the
WTO dispute settlement mechanism; (2) the TRIPS Council review
process; and (3) the continued use of Special 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of
1974 (Special 301). I will discuss each of these in turn.
In early 2000, Charles Levy, a Washington lawyer and lobbyist for the
IPC, outlined the IPC's post-TRIPS strategy. Bemoaning "significant

2. IPC membership has fluctuated between eleven and fourteen members. At the time that
the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations had gotten underway in 1986, its members were: BristolMyers, CBS, DuPont, General Electric, General Motors, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Johnson &
Johnson, Merck, Monsanto, and Pfizer.
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noncompliance"3 with TRIPS, he recommended that TRIPS supporters
pursue litigation "selectively, bringing those cases they know they can win
and that present the strategic issues that will develop the necessary body
of precedent." 4 Further, he argued that IPC members must display resolve
by taking dispute settlements "as far as necessary" to ensure full
compliance with TRIPS.5 Levy expressed hope that this strategy would
turn high profile dispute resolution decisions into powerful examples that
other countries with lax IP policies would choose to follow. Levy also
stressed the benefits of both intergovernmental and private sector
diplomacy and emphasized that the business community, and in particular,
"companies with a major presence in a country, can play a role in helping
countries to understand the benefits of fully implementing the legal regime
required by TRIPS." 6
Not surprisingly, the United States has been the most aggressive
country in the IP arena. It has filed fifteen cases, more TRIPS complaints
than all other WTO member-countries combined. Most of the cases have
been initiated by either the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers
of America (PhRMA), a number of whose companies the IPC represents,
or member-companies of the IIPA. True to the strategy advocated by
Levy, all fifteen U.S.-filed TRIPS cases have been straightforward
violation complaints in which states simply failed to enact TRIPS
provisions.7 Judith Bello also predicted that the early IP cases would be
easy wins that would help build support for the system.8
Eric Smith, president of the IIPA, urged the use of WTO dispute
settlement machinery and also the TRIPS Council's9 practice of reviewing
implementation procedures and obligations to point out deficiencies in
various countries' laws. For the review process, states must first notify the
TRIPS Council of steps taken to implement TRIPS, and then respond to

3. Charles S. Levy, Implementing Trips - A Test of Political Will, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 789, 789 (2000).
4. Id. at 790.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 794.
7. Tuan Samahon, TRIPS Copyright Dispute Settlement After the Transition and
Moratorium: Nonviolation and Situation Complaints Against Developing Countries, 31 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1051, 1059 (2000).
8. Judith H. Bello, Some Practical Observations About WTO Settlement of Intellectual
Property Disputes, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 357, 357-67 (1997).
9. Formally known as the "Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights." The TRIPS Council is a committee of the whole consisting of all current WTO members.
It oversees TRIPS implementation.
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questions asked by other TRIPS Council members. The IIPA and other
interested parties submit questions and detailed enforcement information
to the USTR for the TRIPS Council review process. According to Smith,
"This is an important means to put pressure on countries that have not yet
fully implemented their obligations to do so immediately or risk the
commencement of a formal consultation and dispute settlement process."' 0
Indeed, in 1998, the USTR reported that it used the TRIPS Council
meetings as opportunities "to educate developing country members as to
how these provisions must be implemented in their laws."" The USTR
indicated that the TRIPS Council meetings were useful for keeping
pressure on developing country members and provided a valuable forum
for confirming U.S. interpretations of TRIPS.' 2 In the years leading up to
TRIPS, the IIPA vigorously supported the use of bilateral and unilateral
diplomacy to promote strong IP protection. In 1984 and 1988, the IIPA
promoted revisions of the U.S. Trade and Tariff Act that would amplify IP
components and increase U.S. trade leverage against countries that failed
to adequately protect U.S.-held IP.
Smith also championed the use of additional trade tools such as the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), a system of non-reciprocal
trade benefits for developing countries, and regional initiatives such as the
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and the Andean Trade Preferences Act
(ATPA). Smith and others lobbied to establish that inadequate IP
protection would be grounds for suspending a country's trade privileges
under these programs. Smith praised the fact that in its implementing
legislation for TRIPS, the United States expressly retained its prerogative
to suspend privileges under the GSP program and the CBI without
abrogating its WTO obligations. For instance, in March 1998, the USTR
suspended a portion of Honduras' benefits under the GSP and the CBI
because of pirated television satellite signals that originated from the
country. The Honduran case began in 1992 when the Motion Picture
Association of America filed a petition under the GSP program and
"alleged widespread unauthorized broadcasting of pirated videos and re-

10. World Trade Organization:HearingsBefore the House Subcomm. on Trade ofthe Comm.
on Ways and Means, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (testimony of Eric H. Smith, President, Int'l
Intellectual Prop. Alliance) [hereinafter Smith Testimony].
11. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1998 Trade Policy Agenda and 1997
Annual Report of the Presidentof the UnitedStates on the TradeAgreements Program60 (1998),
available at http://www.ustr.gov/html/1998tpacontents.html [hereinafter USTR 1998 Report].
12. Id.
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broadcasting of U.S. satellite-carried programming."' 3 Argentina also lost
GSP benefits on about $260 million worth of its exports in 1997. In
February 2000, the USTR's GSP subcommittee accepted IIPA petitions
and began to investigate the copyright policies of Armenia, the Dominican
Republic, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 14 These
countries may well appear on future lists if they do not respond
satisfactorily to the IIPA.
Furthermore, the IP industry has supported the efforts of the United
States to secure TRIPS-plus provisions through bilateral treaties. For
example, the United States sought to accelerate TRIPS compliance from
developing countries prior to the negotiated deadlines (or "transition
periods"). This resulted in widespread industry dissatisfaction with the
negotiated transition periods.
Smith further underscored the continued importance of Special 301,
"which has done more than any other provision of U.S. trade law to
improve the level of worldwide protection of U.S. products embodying
copyright."' 5 Special 30116 requires the identification of countries with
priority IP rights. Countries targeted under this law are vulnerable to trade
sanctions if they fail to comply with the requests of the United States for
changes in IP policies. To the delight of IP industry activists, the United
States strengthened Special 301 in its implementing legislation by
requiring the USTR to take into account a country's prior status under
Special 301, the history of the efforts of the United States under Special
301, and the country's response to such efforts when determining whether
to pursue sanctions. To the extent that this increases information
requirements for the USTR, it may make the USTR even more dependent
on private sector groups for data and analysis. However, this amendment
was designed to help highlight persistent recalcitrance in the face of
Special 301 pressure.
Private actors do not have standing at the WTO. They must convey
their wishes to the USTR and hope that the USTR will act on their behalf
13. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, Report to Congress on Section 301
Developments Required by Section 309(a)(3) of the Trade Act of 1974 (June 1996 -Jan. 1998),
available at http:/ www.ustr.gov/pd/sec30l.pdf.
14. Press Release, Int'l Intellectual Prop. Alliance, IIPA testifies at GSP Hearings to Urge
Six Countries to Comply with 'Adequate and Effective' Standards of Copyright Protection and
Enforcement as Required Under U.S. Trade Program (May 12, 2000), available at
http://www.iipa.com/pressreleases/2000_May l2_GSP. PDF.
15. Smith Testimony, supra note 10.
16. While widely known as "Special 301," this provision is section 182 of the Trade Act of
1974, added by section 1303 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.
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to take up their particular causes. The USTR has been remarkably
responsive to the expressed wishes of these key private sector actors. In
1996, the USTR established an Office of Monitoring and Enforcement.
This office oversees trade agreement implementation and pursues
enforcement actions by aggressively litigating disputes to compel
compliance with the WTO agreements, NAFTA, and other regional and
bilateral agreements.' The same office also addresses problems outside
the framework of the multilateral and regional treaties by invoking section
301 and Special 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. It is likely to be a
coincidence that the number of trading partners named under Special 301
in 1996 increased by 25% in 1997.8 Ironically, at the Uruguay Round of
trade negotiations, many countries hoped to make Special 301 pressure
disappear by agreeing to a higher multilateral standard for IP protection.
However, despite this, the pressure has hardly vanished.
Levy expressed his initial belief that the force of the concept "the rule
of law" was "so infectious that it would necessarily spur voluntary
compliance by developing countries to implement effective protection."'"
In fact, IP industry activists originally hoped that the incorporation of IP
and dispute settlement mechanisms into the WTO would reduce the
transaction costs of firms by eliminating, or at least sharply reducing, the
need for costly and time consuming bilateral and unilateral negotiations.
The IPC initially expected most countries to first bring their laws into
compliance and then use the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to finetune or address those few countries whose laws needed further adjustment.
However, Jacques Gorlin, advisor to the IPC, admitted that one of the
biggest surprises in the wake of TRIPS was the extent of wholesale noncompliance.20 He indicated that the use of the WTO to address so many
flagrant and extensive violations of TRIPS would threaten to overload the
system. Therefore, litigation and the continued use of Special 301 are
guaranteed.
For example, Gorlin singled out Argentina as a particularly egregious
violator of IP protection, therefore making the Argentine case worth
examining in some detail. The case against Argentina was perhaps the
most impassioned one for PhRMA. Since 1985, PhRMA has wrangled
with the Argentine government over its patent regime. At PhRMA's

17. USTR 1998 Report, supra note 11.
18. Id. at 244.
19. Levy, supra note 3, at 790.
20. Jacques Gorlin, Address at the Yeshiva Univ. Benjamin Cardozo Sch. of Law
Symposium, IntellectualProperty, World Trade, and Global Elites (Mar. 7, 2001).
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behest, the USTR placed Argentina on the Special 301 list in 1989 and
kept it there until 1993. President Carlos Menem pledged to strengthen
Argentina's patent laws and successfully dodged U.S. trade sanctions.
However, due to the political power of Argentina's domestic
pharmaceutical labs, the Argentine Congress resisted Menem's efforts to
ratchet up levels of pharmaceutical protection.2 ' The Congress proposed
weaker legislation, reflecting the interests ofthe domestic labs, but Menem
vetoed any Argentine legislation that did not meet U.S. standards. "In
April of 1995, under intense pressure from the United States, Menem
issued a 'Regulatory Decree' which would protect pharmaceutical patents
effective as of January 1, 1996, and give immediate retroactive pipeline
protection" (the latter provision clearly being TRIPS-plus).22 The
Argentine Senate soon responded by overturning ten of the sixteen central
provisions of Menem's PhRMA-friendly decree. The Argentine Congress
passed Law 24,481 as revised by the Senate. The contest of wills
continued as Menem submitted a "corrective law," "which reduced the
transition period for implementing pharmaceutical protection from ten to
five years. 23 The Argentine Congress responded with a compromise bill,
which retained the five-year transition period, but added provisions for
compulsory licensing. In March 1996, Menem finally signed the decree
enacting this law.
In December 1996, the Argentine "Congress passed a surprising new
non-patent provision which permits an innovator's competitors to use the
innovator's test data when the competitors seek marketing approval. 24 In
the United States, there is a five-year moratorium on the use of test data
(after which it may become available to potential competitors). PhRMA
charged that the new Argentine test data provisions were a "thinly
disguised attempt to invalidate the 2pharmaceutical
patent protection which
5
had just recently been approved.,
In 1997, at the behest of PhRMA, the USTR responded with the
withdrawal of benefits for about 50% (or $260 million) of Argentine
exports under the GSP program. The USTR "admitted that it decided to

21. The following summary is based on Wendy S. Vicente, Questionable Victoryfor Coerced
Argentine PharmaceuticalPatentLegislation, 19 U. PA. L. REV. 1101-40 (1998).
22. Id. at 1106-07.
23. Id. at 1107.
24. Id.
25. Id. (quoting Robert S. Tancer & Shoshana B. Tancer, Mercosurand the Pharmaceutical
Industry - Waiting for a Common Patent Regime, LATIN AM. L. & Bus. REP., Apr. 30, 1997,
availableat 1997 WL 9499053).
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enforce these patent law related sanctions based entirely on information
and data supplied by PhRMA. 26 These sanctions were based largely upon
the test data exclusivity issue. Article 39(3) of TRIPS mandates that such
data be protected against unfair commercial use. The U.S. drug industry
interprets this to cover a broad range of activity, whereas many developing
countries favor a narrow interpretation to give them greater latitude.
Argentina's Law 24,766 articles 4 and 11 protect test data in cases of
narrowly defined "dishonest commercial practices" and provides no
protection for data that has been. published in scientific or academic
circles."
After the imposition of the trade sanctions, Argentina threatened to
avail itself of the five-year grace period for TRIPS compliance. PhRMA
repeatedly declared that Argentina was the "worst expropriator of U.S.
pharmaceutical inventions in the Western Hemisphere" and has tirelessly
complained about the robust Argentine "pirate" pharmaceutical industry.28
The United States initiated consultations with Argentina via the WTO
process in May 1999 because of Argentina's failure to provide exclusive
marketing rights and to try to prevent Argentina from watering down its
existing levels of protection during the transition period. In May 2000, the
USTR expanded its claims in this dispute to include, among other things,
the test data issue.29
The future of the Argentine case may be in doubt. Both the Argentine
case and a Brazilian WTO case initiated by the United States in 2000 have
attracted considerable attention. Whether or not these two cases involve
straightforward TRIPS violations, they go to the heart of the access to
essential medicines campaign. PhRMA pressed the USTR to object to
Brazil's patent law provision that local working of the patent is required
for the patent holder to enjoy patent rights in Brazil. TRIPS stipulated that
importation of a patented item satisfies any working requirement. Brazil's
law permits it to issue compulsory licenses for goods that are not
manufactured locally within three years of receiving patent protection;
mere importation does not count. Brazil maintains that the threat of
compulsory licensing helps it to negotiate reasonable drug prices with

26. Vicente, supra note 21, at 1108.
27. Id. at 1111.
28. PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS

OF AMERICA, SUBMISSION OF THE

PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA FOR THE' SPECIAL 301' REPORT

ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BARRIERS 3 (Feb. 23, 1998) [hereinafter PHRMA SPECIAL 301
REPORT].
29. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, Highlights in US. InternationalTrade

DisputeSettlement (June 2000), available at http://www.ustr.gov.
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global pharmaceutical companies. The country has used this threat
effectively against Roche and Merck in its quest for access to affordable
AIDS drugs. Activist citizen groups, such as Mddecins Sans Fronti6res,
have pointed out that Brazil's approach to this issue has permitted the
country to pursue stunningly successful policies aimed at reducing AIDS
deaths by making generic equivalents of lifesaving drugs available at low
cost." On June 25, 2001, the USTR announced that it was officially
withdrawing its WTO case against Brazil. U.S. Trade Representative
Robert Zoellick noted that "litigating this dispute before a WTO dispute
panel has not been the most constructive way to address our differences,
especially since Brazil has never actually used the provision at issue."'"
The U.S. withdrawal of this politically embarrassing case may portend
reconsideration of the Argentine case as well.
Overall, the IP industry's strategy to achieve full-scale compliance with
TRIPS has been to press the USTR to invoke Special 301 and WTO
dispute settlement measures, and to use trade leverage and the TRIPS
Council forum. Despite the apparent setback for the IP industry resulting
from the withdrawal of the WTO case against Brazil, the industry presses
ahead with negotiations to require TRIPS-plus commitments in both
bilateral and regional contexts, such as the Free Trade Agreement of the
Americas.32 Therefore, the IP industry continues to engage in extensive
monitoring of global IP protection.

III. OPPOSITION

The two most prominent threads of opposition to TRIPS concentrate on
patents on life forms and patents on pharmaceuticals. Two major civil
society action campaigns have gained momentum and have tempered some
of the harsher edges of the agreement through their activity. While it is too
late to undo TRIPS, these campaigns are a sign of things to come. For
example, efforts to obtain multilateral TRIPS-plus protection are now

30. Press Release, Mddecins Sans Frontires, U.S. Action at WTO Threatens Brazil's
Successful AIDS Programme (Feb. 1, 2001), available at http://www.msf.org/content/page.cfm?
articleid= db833aca-9d3e-43d7-aa534fd650ec71 bd.
31. Gary Yerkey & Daniel Pruzin, The UnitedStates Drops WTO Case Against Brazil Over
HIV/AIDS Patent, WTO REP., BUREAU OF NAT'L AFF. INC. (June 26, 2001), available at
http://www.cptech org/ip/health/c/brazilfbna6262001.html.
32. GENETIC RESOURCES ACTION INTERNATIONAL, 'TRIPS-Plus' Through the Back Door:
How Bilateral Treaties Impose Much Stronger Rules for IPRs on Life than the WTO, available at
http://www.grain.org/ publications/trips-plus-en.cfm (July 2001).
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likely to encounter active resistance (as suggested above, many countries
remain vulnerable to bilateral pressure for TRIPS-plus protection).
Furthermore, these groups have opened up the discussion that undoubtedly
should have taken place before and during the negotiations themselves. As
the United Nations Development Programme's 1999 Human Development
Report stated, the IP agreements were signed "before most governments
and people understood the social and economic implications of patents on
life. They were also negotiated with far too little participation from many
developing countries now feeling the impact of their conditions."33
A. Agriculture and Plant Varieties
The patenting of life forms raises a whole host of issues. Participants
in this debate claim that what is at stake here is no less than control over
the world's food supply, not to mention implications on scientific research
and public access. The issue is shot through with economic, political, and
philosophical significance. On one side of the debate are America's
biotechnology, pharmaceutical, agricultural, chemical, and seed industries,
which champion patentability with no exceptions. On the other side are
grass roots activists, farmers, environmental development, human rights,
and consumer groups, which support a global no patents on life campaign.
While some of the issues in this debate are not new, what is new is the
mobilization of these groups to oppose American corporations'
increasingly aggressive approach to IP.
As early as 1993, when TRIPS negotiations were still underway,
hundreds of thousands of Indian farmers demonstrated against certain
TRIPS proposals, claiming that their right to save, reproduce, and modify
seeds would be jeopardized by the required implementing legislation.34
Vandana Shiva, an Indian grass roots activist, helped to mobilize the
campaign against what she called "biopiracy."35 Biopiracy is the
unauthorized and uncompensated expropriation of genetic resources and
traditional knowledge. It is seen as a new form of Western imperialism in
which global seed and pharmaceutical corporations" plunder the

33.

UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT

1999,

at 74 (1999).

34. Joan Sutherland, TRIPS, CulturalPolitics and Law Reform, 16 PROMETHEUS 291, 293
(1998).
35. VANDANA SHIVA, BIoPIRAcY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE (1997).
36. In many instances, due to extensive merger activity in the past decade, these corporations
are one in the same. For example, when Sandoz and Ciba-Geigy completed their $63 billion merger
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biodiversity and traditional knowledge of the developing world. According
to this argument, corporations first alter these discoveries with science,
patent them, and then resell the derived products or processes at exorbitant
rates to the very people from whom they stole. This turns the discourse of
piracy, as bandied about in TRIPS and 301 proceedings, upside down. A
number of activists seek to demonstrate that, rhetoric to the contrary
notwithstanding, America's global corporations are the biggest pirates on
the planet.
Farmers have traditionally saved seeds and reused them. They have
traded and sold seeds to each other, and have created and experimented
with new hybrids. In these ways, they have contributed to the planet's
biological diversity. In the past, American laws covering plant varieties
incorporated the notion of farmers' rights to allow farmers to retain their
freedom to engage in these important and traditional activities. However,
in August 1994, the U.S. Congress amended the Plant Variety Protection
Act of 1970 and removed the farmer's exemption. Now "it is expressly
illegal for farmers to sell or save seeds from proprietary crop varieties37
without receiving permission from breeders and paying royalties.
Grassroots activists are convinced that American industries are seeking the
same goal through TRIPS by pushing a particular interpretation of sui
generis protection under article 27.3(b) of TRIPS.
To the dismay of the American biotechnology industry, TRIPS
ultimately placed restrictions on such patenting. Article 27 of TRIPS
permits the exclusion of plants and animals from patentability, but article
27.3(b) requires that members provide protection for plant varieties either
by patents or an "effective sui generis"system. However, there really is no
consensus on what a sui generis system needs to include. As Sutherland
points out, the drafting history of article 27 provides little guidance
because the records are scant, and there is no record on the meaning of sui
generis.38
American IP industry activists have been pushing for the adoption of
the Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) as the
model sui generis system.39 Any country that wishes to join the UPOV
today must sign the treaty, which was last amended in 1991. The 1978

in 1996, the new firm, Novartis, became "the world's number-one agrochemical corporation,
second largest seed firm, third largest pharmaceutical firm, and fourth largest veterinary medicine
company." SETH SHULMAN, OWNING THE FUTURE 49 (1999).
37. Id.
38. Sutherland, supra note 34, at 295.
39. As of 1999, forty-four mainly industrialized countries subscribed to the UPOV.
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version of the UPOV provided two limitations on the monopoly rights of
plant breeders: other breeders could freely use UPOV protected varieties
for research purposes, and farmers could reuse the seeds for the following
year's sowing under certain conditions. The 1991 revision "narrowed down
the exemption for competing breeders and it deleted the so-called farmer's
privilege.... [It] extends the breeders' monopoly right to the products of
the farmer's harvest."4 Therefore, the UPOV makes seed saving a crime.
Although the UPOV is very generous to the corporate plant breeder, the
1991 amendments sharply limit the rights of farmers.
In the agricultural sector, activists argue that, in the past decade, patent
and sui generis plant variety protection based on the UPOV has led to
extensive economic concentration. The vertical integration of plant
breeding, agrochemical, and food processing corporations have caused a
situation in which "the top ten seed companies currently control 30% of the
world's U.S. $23 billion commercial seed market."4' Corporate plant
breeders have obtained broad patents that will have far reaching
consequences. "Breeders are patenting entire species (cotton), economic
characteristics (oil quality), plant reproductive behavior (apomixis) and
basic. techniques of biotechnology (gene transfer tools)."4' 2 This
combination of economic concentration with extensive and broad patenting
points to the fact that a handful of global corporations are making huge
inroads toward control of the world's food supply and are entangling
farmers and indigenous peoples in an ever more complex web of licensing
and royalty obligations.
The ultimately scuttled 1996 bilateral IP rights treaty between the
United States and Ecuador illustrates how commercial and social agendas
have clashed on these issues. The American case against Ecuador covered
a broad spectrum of TRIPS violations including patent, copyright, and
trademark areas. Ecuador negotiated a bilateral IP treaty with the United
States for several years. The two countries came close to reaching an
agreement on TRIPS-plus provisions that included a reduction in the grace

40. GENETIC RESOURCES ACTION INTERNATIONAL, UPOVon the War Path, SEEDLING, June

1999, available at http://www.grain.org/pubications/jun99/jun991.htm.
41. GENETIC RESOURCES ACTION INTERNATIONAL, Intellectual

Property Rights and

Biodiversity: The Economic Myths, GLOBAL TRADE AND BIODIVERSITY INCONFLICT, Oct. 1998,

available at http://www.grain. org/publications/issue3-en.cfm.
42. Id.
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period and a stipulation that plant varieties would be protected either by
patents or a system comparable to UPOV.43 The United States convinced
Ecuador to provide for either patent or UPOV protection for plant varieties.
It is important to note that TRIPS does not require UPOV protection;
UPOV protection is not the only, permissible approach to sui generis
protection. American activists, affiliated with an international civil society
group called the "Indigenous Peoples' Biodiversity Network" (IPBN),
tracked American patent databases for controversial ownership claims and
discovered that a U.S. citizen had obtained a patent on a plant species used
as the main ingredient of the sacred Amazonian hallucinogenic drink
ayahuasca." The IPBN passed the information on to the environmental
non-governmental organization (NGO) Acci6n Ecol6gica. This
environmental NGO mobilized protests, occupied the Ecuadorian
Congressional Chamber in July 1996, and ultimately blocked ratification
of the IP treaty.45 In its 1997 filing, the IIPA expressed dismay over
Ecuador's decision to renege "on its obligation to implement TRIPS
obligations without transition., 46 The USTR cited this in its WTO filing,
that Ecuador had acceded to the WTO, and that the country had committed
to implementing TRIPS within seven months of accession.47 Finally, in
May 1998, the President of Ecuador and the Ecuadorian Congress passed
a comprehensive law that substantially increased protection for patents,
copyrights, and trademarks.
Developing countries and NGOs continue to pursue alternative
approaches to sui generis protection. The principles enshrined in such
alternatives are captured in the 1997 Thammasat Resolution (Resolution).
In December 1997, the Thai Network on Community Rights and
Biodiversity and the Genetic Resources Action International (GRAIN)
assembled over forty NGO representatives from Africa, Asia, and Latin
America to discuss strategies to combat the mounting pressure to patent
life forms.4' This group issued the Resolution to enunciate their principles

43. The USTR has urged countries to incorporate TRIPS-plus provisions into bilateral treaties
with the United States.
44. SHULMAN, supra note 36, at 127.
45. Sutherland, supra note 34, at 292.
46. Letter from the Int'l Intellectual Prop. Alliance, to Joseph Papovich, Deputy Assistant;
USTR for Intellectual Prop. (Feb. 24, 1997), available at http://www.ilPa.com/html/rbi_
special 301 Ittr 22497.html.
47. Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Announces Results of Special 301
Annual Review (Apr. 30, 1997), available at http://www.ustr.gov.
48. See GENETIC RESOURCES ACTION INTERNATIONAL, Towards Our Sui Generis Rights,
SEEDLING, Dec. 1997, availableat http://www. grain.org/publications/dec97/dec971 .htm.
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and strategies. The Resolution called for a revision of TRIPS that would
expressly permit countries to exclude life forms and biodiversity-related
knowledge from IP rights monopolies; provide for the global mobilization
of environmental, agricultural, consumer, health, food security, women's,
human rights, and people's organizations; and establish the primacy of the
1993 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 49 over TRIPS. Farmers'
rights were ultimately incorporated into the U.N. CBD, which has become
an important metric for developing countries' approaches to TRIPS article
27.3(b).5°
India was one of the first countries to advocate the primacy of the CBD
over TRIPS article 27.3(b). The CBD, unlike TRIPS, recognizes the rights
of indigenous cultures to preserve their knowledge and resources.5" Article
80) of the CBD recognizes communal knowledge, which is clearly at odds
with the individualistic conceptions embodied in TRIPS and the rejection
of so-called "folklore" (versus "science") protection of Western patent law.
Article 8() calls for respect and preservation of "innovations ... and
practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional
lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity and to promote their wider application with the approval and
involvement of the holders of such knowledge, innovations and utilization
of such knowledge, innovations and practices.' 52 Furthermore, the CBD
stresses that biological resources are the national sovereignty of nation
states, whereas TRIPS endorses private property rights over them. India
argued that TRIPS needed to be amended to comply with the CBD 3 At
the same time, numerous countries joined the sui generis "rights
movement" and proposed legislation to address concerns raised by antibiopiracy activists. Countries such as Kenya, India, Nicaragua, Costa Rica,
Zambia, Zimbabwe, Thailand, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, and the
Organization for African Unity have all been working on sui generis

49. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992,31 I.L.M. 818 [hereinafter Biological
Diversity].
50. In 1985, the Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI), a Canadian-based
international NGO, developed the concept of farmers' rights as a counterweight to plant breeders'
rights. RAFI introduced this principle during the U.N. Food and Agriculture deliberations over
plant genetic resources in the so-called "seed wars" of the 1980s. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS,
GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 572 (2000); Sutherland, supra note 34, at 292.
51. Biological Diversity, supra note 49, art. 80).
52. Id.
53. Valentina Tejera, Note, Tripping Over PropertyRights: Is It Possibleto Reconcile the
Convention on BiologicalDiversitywith Article 27 of the TRIPSAgreement?, 33 NEWENG. L. REV.
967, 981 (1999).
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legislation that distances itself from the UPOV model and addresses the
concerns raised above. 4
When TRIPS was negotiated, participants agreed to revisit article
27.3(b) four years after the date of entry into force. In December 1998, the
TRIPS Council met to discuss procedures for the upcoming review, but
fought over whether members were charged with reviewing
implementation or actual provisions. The United States was eager to
confine discussions to implementation only, whereas India and the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations stressed that the mandate expressly
covered provisions. Ultimately, TRIPS Council members agreed that they
were required to discuss substantive provisions. The U.S. agenda included
the deletion of exclusions to patents on life forms and the incorporation of
the 1991 revision of the International Convention for the Protection of
New Variety of Plants (UPOV 91)" into TRIPS. Given the building
momentum over sui generis rights and the CBD-TRIPS conflicts,
developing countries eagerly approached the review as an opportunity to
follow through on the Resolution pronouncements. Developing countries
were prepared to resist the incorporation of UPOV 91 into TRIPS as the
sui generis alternative, request extensions for implementation, and insist
upon the primacy of CBD over TRIPS in cases of conflict.
Throughout 1999, TRIPS Council deliberations in preparation for the
December 1999 Seattle Ministerial dragged on as the Quad countries
(Canada, the European Union (EU), Japan, and the United States) tried to
restrict discussions to issues ofimplementation, while developing countries
pressed for more substantive discussions. In June 1999, GRAIN reported
that the WTO, in conjunction with the UPOV, actively campaigned to push
UPOV protection on developing countries. 6 With positions so far apart,
participants made no substantive progress towards clarifying or
reformulating article 27.3(b). The 1999 Seattle Ministerial yielded very
little after the EU and the United States deadlocked when agriculture and
huge protests organized by a broad array of international NGOs stymied
deliberations.

54. For additional examples, see GENETIC REsouRcEs ACTION INTERNATIONAL, The TRIPS
Review Takes Off, SEEDLING, Dec. 1998, available at http://www.grain.org/publications/dec98/
dec983.htm.
55. International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, opened for
signatureDec. 2, 1961, 33 U.S.T. 2703, 815 U.N.T.S. 109.
56. GENETIC RESOURCES ACTION INTERNATIONAL, UPOVon the War Path, SEEDLING, June
1999, available at http://www.grain.org/publications/jun99/jun991 .htm.
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While clearly disappointed by the lack of progress in the desired
direction, IPC lawyer Levy noted the silver lining in the Seattle cloud. As
Levy put it, "The good news is that members did not have a chance to
tinker with TRIPS. Because there was no Ministerial Declaration, they did
not have to deal with the cross-currents that were building on intellectual
property."" It is hard to imagine that those "cross-currents" will disappear
any time soon. Future efforts to negotiate multilateral TRIPS-plus
provisions will be met with resistance.
B. PharmaceuticalPatents
A related area of opposition to TRIPS is pharmaceutical patents. The
so-called "rights talk" of the TRIPS deliberations obscured the fact that IP
"rights" are actually grants of privileges.5" "Grants talk" highlights that,
what may be granted may be taken away when such grants conflict with
other important goals. Public health is one such goal. As Braithwaite and
Drahos suggest, "had TRIPS been framed as a public health issue, the
anxiety of mass publics in the U.S. and other Western states might have
become a factor in destabilizing the consensus that U.S. business elites had
' Indeed, as this section reveals, public health
built around TRIPS."59
activists scored some important victories by achieving some retreat from
the heretofore unqualified U.S. government support for its global
pharmaceutical companies. Globally, considerable momentum appears to
be building in favor of a public health perspective on patent rights.
Curiously, despite the fact that the TRIPS deliberations focused on policies
that affect virtually everyone on the planet, the GATT Secretariat received
no complaints from consumer groups at the time of the negotiations. In
light of this fact, Braithwaite and Drahos concluded that the consumer
movement had been largely "reactive and ineffectual" in this area, at least
until recently.6' In the wake of TRIPS, a growing NGO campaign for
access to essential medicines has gained momentum.
American consumer activist Ralph Nader and his colleague James
Love, director for the Consumer Project on Technology, launched a postTRIPS opposition campaign focusing on health care issues. Their core

57. Levy, supra note 3, at 794-95.
58. R. Weissman, A Long, Strange TRIPS: The PharmaceuticalIndustry Driveto Harmonize
GlobalIntellectualPropertyRules, andthe Remaining WTO LegalAlternativesAvailable to Third
World Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1069, 1087 (1996).
59. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 50, at 576.
60. Id. at 202.
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issue was the high cost of pharmaceutical drugs. Nader and Love have
been outspoken critics of American trade policy with regard to bilateral IP
agreements and TRIPS, arguing that the USTR has been too narrowly
focused on protecting the interests of U.S.-based international
pharmaceutical companies."
U.S. trade pressure on both South Africa and Thailand helped to
galvanize criticism of TRIPS in relation to health policy. Faced with
debilitating HIV/AIDS crises, these two countries sought to employ
compulsory licensing to manufacture AIDS drugs more cheaply.
Compulsory licensing allows states to produce generic drugs, which are
more affordable, and increases access to the drugs. When a state grants a
compulsory license, rights to produce a product are licensed to another
party without the patent holder's permission. TRIPS articles 30 and 31
permit compulsory licensing of patents under restricted conditions. These
were two articles that the pharmaceutical industry lost on during TRIPS
negotiations. Under TRIPS article 31, licenses must be used in domestic
markets and the products may not be exported.62 Countries in the grip of
the HIV/AIDS crisis seek exception to this rule so that countries can export
products manufactured under compulsory licenses. Therefore, countries
with small domestic markets could also benefit from economies of scale.
In December 1997, South African President Nelson Mandela signed the
South African Medicines and Medical Devices Regulatory Authority Act
(Medicines Act).63 The Medicines Act allows the Minister of Health to
revoke patents on medicines and allow for broad-based compulsory
licensing to manufacture generic versions of HIV/AIDS drugs. The
Medicines Act also permits parallel importing so that South Africa may
take advantage of discriminatory pricing policies and import the cheapest
available patented medicines.
In its February 1998 submission to USTR, PhRMA recommended that
South Africa be named a "Priority Foreign Country" and argued that South
African law posed a direct challenge to the achievements of the Uruguay
Round.64 PhRMA further pointed out that South Africa offered no
protection for test data and had introduced price controls. In response, the
USTR placed South Africa on the Special 301 watch list and urged the
South African government to repeal its law. The USTR also pressured

61.
62.
63.
(1998).
64.

See id. at 575-76.
KEITH MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INTHE GLOBAL ECONOMY 178 (2000).

South African Medicines and Medical Devices Regulatory Authority Act, No. 132
See PHRMA SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 28, at 10-11.
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Thailand on behalf of PhRMA in 1997 and 1998. After Thailand planned
to produce a generic version of the AIDS drug ddI, U.S. trade officials
threatened sanctions on core Thai exports. Thailand subsequently dropped
its compulsory licensing plans. Compulsory licensing, permitted under
TRIPS, "was intended as a lifeline. But in practice, any country reaching
for it has been handcuffed by U.S. trade negotiators."65
In spite of the pressure from the USTR, South Africa refused to repeal
its law, and gained some activist supporters in the process. The U.S. AIDS
advocacy group ACT-UP supported South Africa's cause by repeatedly
disrupting Vice-President Al Gore's campaign appearances in the summer
and early fall of 1999. Shortly thereafter, Gore met privately with South
Africa's President Thabo Mkebi, and on September 17, 1999, the United
States removed South Africa from the USTR watch list.66 Nader, Love, and
Robert Weissman wrote a letter to U.S. Trade Representative Charlene
Barshefsky expressing pleasure with the decision to stop pressuring South
Africa, and urging the USTR to extend its policy in the South African case
to all developing countries.67 They also recommended that the USTR
reconsider its position on Thailand's compulsory licensing efforts, parallel
importing, and test data exclusivity.
A broad global campaign for access to essential medicines has emerged
to protest U.S. IP trade policy and the TRIPS favoritism toward
commercial interests over public health concerns. Mddecins Sans
Frontires (MSF)" is a highly regarded, Paris-based, Nobel Prize winning
humanitarian NGO that has spearheaded a global campaign to draw
attention to this issue. Working together with Love's Consumer Project on
Technology and Amsterdam-based Health Action International,69 MSF
undertook a number of activities leading up to the WTO Seattle Ministerial
of December 1999. Along the way, they picked up the support of the U.N.
Development Program, the WHO, and the World Bank. "Ok Pannenborg,
the World Bank official who oversees health investments in Africa and the
Bank's purchase of nearly $800 million a year in pharmaceuticals,.. . said
[that] the World Bank is comfortable with compulsory licensing and...
parallel importing, or shopping around for the best retail price on patented

65. Karl Vick, African AIDS Victims Losers of a Drug War, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 1999, at
Al.
66. Id.
67. See Letter from Ralph Nader et al., to Charlene Barshefsky, U.S. Trade Representative
(Oct. 6, 1999), availableat http:// www.cptech.org/ip/health/country/cb-oct6-99.html.
68. Also known as "Doctors Without Borders."
69. Health Action International is an informal network of over 150 consumer, health,
development, and other public interest groups involved in health and pharmaceutical issues.
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drugs."7 In May 1999, the World Health Assembly (the governing body
of the WHO) unanimously enacted resolution WHA52.19,71 which calls
upon member states to ensure equitable access to essential drugs and
review options under international agreements to safeguard access to these
medicines.72 In its open letter to WTO member states, the Campaign for
Access to Essential Medicines (Campaign) called upon governments to
consider a number of measures in relation to TRIPS obligations to increase
access to essential medicines. The Campaign urged WTO member states
to make public health their highest priority in implementing TRIPS
obligations, explore the extension of grace periods for developing
countries, and encourage developing countries to actively invoke the public
health and public interest considerations of TRIPS articles 7 and 8.
The Campaign strongly advocated generic drug competition. For
example, according to the Campaign, the essential drug Fluconazole, used
to treat cryptococcal meningitis (afflicting many who suffer from
HIV/AIDS) sells for $14-25 per daily dose in markets where Pfizer has
exclusivity, but sells for $0.75 or less in those countries with generic
competition. Clearly referring to the practices of the USTR, the Campaign
urged WTO member states to prevent the use of trade sanctions against
countries that do not implement TRIPS-plus obligations on policies
concerning access to essential medicines.
In late November 1999, on the eve of the Seattle Ministerial, the
Campaign held the conference "Increasing Access to Essential Drugs in a
Globalized Economy Working Towards Solutions" in Amsterdam. The
Campaign issued the "Amsterdam Statement" calling for the WTO to
establish a working group on access to medicines, endorse the use of
compulsory licensing of patents under article 31, and allow exceptions to
patent rights under article 30 for production of medicines for export
markets, when the medicine is exported to a country with a compulsory
license. This latter exception would help countries with small domestic
markets in which local production is not feasible. The statement also called

70. Vick, supra note 65.
71. WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY, Resolution 52.19, Revised DrugStrategy (May 24, 1999),
available at http://www.who.int/gb/EB_ WHA/PDF/WHA52/ResWHA52/e 19.pdf.
72. See Letter from Bernard Pecoul et al., Dir. of Access to Essential Drugs Meds. Project,
Mddecins Sans Fronti~res, MSF Reaction to UNAIDS Proposal (May 11, 2000), available at
http://www.msf.org/un/reports/2000/05/pr-unaids/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2000).
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for the avoidance of overly restrictive interpretations of article 39
regarding health registration data.73
In Seattle, President Clinton signaled a major change in U.S. policy and
responded to the goals of the access campaign. He announced that the
United States would alter its trade policy to support Africa's access to
HIV/AIDS medicines and introduced institutional collaboration between
the USTR and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services on trade
cases involving public health issues.
In May 2000, the Joint United Nations Program on AIDS (UNAIDS)
announced, in conjunction with five global pharmaceutical companies
(Boehringer Ingelheim, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Glaxo Wellcome, Merck &
Co., and F. Hoffman-La Roche), plans to slash prices of AIDS drugs for
select African countries. MSF instantly and harshly criticized the plan,
characterizing it as a cynical attempt by corporations to prevent countries
from availing themselves of compulsory licensing provisions and seizing
the companies' patents. As James McIntyre, chief AIDS researcher and
doctor in Soweto, stated, "If the companies are just doing this to protect
their intellectual property rights, it will be a waste of time."'74 Bernard
Pecoul, director of the MSF Access to Essential Medicines Campaign also
conveyed skepticism about the price reductions. He claimed that the
"opening of discussions 'is a victory, but a small one, much like an
elephant giving birth to a mouse."' 75 MSF continues to criticize the
UNAIDS program on the grounds that the lack of transparency in the
negotiations between the major pharmaceutical companies, UNAIDS, and
governments is stalling the provision of necessary medicines.
On May 10, 2000, the Clinton administration issued an executive order
that incensed the pharmaceutical industry. His order was much bolder than
-the UNAIDS proposal. Clinton announced that he would prohibit the
*USTR from pressuring sub-Saharan African countries into foregoing
legitimate strategies, such as compulsory licensing and parallel importing.
The executive order stated that "the United States shall not seek, through
negotiation or otherwise, the revocation or revision of any intellectual
property law or policy of a beneficiary sub-Saharan African country, as
determined by the president, that regulates HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals or

73. See Symposium, Amsterdam Statement to WTO Member States on Access to Medicine
(Nov. 25-26, 1999), available at http://www. cptech.org/ip/health/amsterdamstatement.html (last
visited July 11, 2001).
74. Kurt Shillinger, AIDS Drug PricesCutfor Africa, PharmaceuticalCompanies Yield to
PressureFrom the White House, B. GLOBE, May 12, 2000, at Al.
75. Donald G. McNeil, Companiesto Cut Cost ofAIDS DrugsforPoorNations,N.Y. TIMES,
May 11, 2000, at Al.
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medical technologies ..... 76 This was a significant departure from past
U.S. policy insofar as it elevated public health into the framing of trade
issues, and this was the first time in many years that the President acted
against the expressed wishes of the non-generic pharmaceutical industry
in the context of trade. The Bush administration has announced it will
uphold the Clinton order.
Predictably, Alan Holmer, president of PhRMA, expressed his
organization's displeasure with Clinton's executive order. He stated that
Clinton's approach to the issue set an "undesirable and inappropriate
precedent, by adopting a discriminatory approach to intellectual property
laws, and focusing exclusively on pharmaceuticals. This opens up
opportunities to invoke exceptions to existing intellectual property
protections. We recognize that AIDS is a major problem, but weakening
intellectual property rights is not the solution."
Companies are increasingly forced to respond to the challenge posed
by the HIV/AIDS crisis and public health activists. Besides, as a part of the
UNAIDS program, in April 2000, Pfizer offered to provide free
fluconazale tablets to South Africa. Some companies fear that these type
of cut-rate drugs provided to developing countries will flood the markets
of developed-countries and reduce profit margins, but public pressure in
the face of what appears to be a treatable health crisis is demanding a
response. Participating companies hope that their counterparts will match
their price reductions and that OECD governments will offer funds to help
Africans buy the drugs. They also hope to preempt any compulsory
licensing of their products.
Early 2001 witnessed a flurry of activity in response to the mounting
public pressure. Thirty-nine pharmaceutical companies brought suit against
South Africa over its 1997 Medicines Act. Scheduled to begin on March
5,2001, the trial quickly became a high profile event marked by protestors,
grim images of dying mothers and babies, street demonstrations, and
extensive media coverage. The powerful imagery conjured up memories
of apartheid, and in public relations terms, the pharmaceutical companies
were besieged. Amid intense public outcry, the companies withdrew their

76. Text of the Africa/HIV/AIDS Executive Order 13155 (May 10, 2000), available at
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/pharm-policy/2001-January/000613.html.
77. Press Release, Alan F. Holmer, President, Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am., Issued the
Following Statement in Response to President Clinton's May 10, 2000 Exec. Order on Access to
HIV/AIDS Pharms. (May 10, 2000), availableathttp://www.phrma.org/press/newsreleasesl/200005-10.12.phtml.
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lawsuit against South Africa. This was widely hailed as an important
victory for citizen group campaigns against the pharmaceutical industry.
Indian generic pharmaceutical manufacturer, Cipla, asked the South
African government for permission to sell generic versions of eight of the
fifteen anti-HIV drugs and pledged to offer an AIDS regimen of three
drugs at $600 per patient annually (versus the $10,000-$15,000 that
American patients pay for the same medicines)." Cipla also offered to sell
the regimen to MSF for $350 a year per patient. Cipla, in conjunction with
MSF, "asked the South African government.

. .

to give it licenses to all

antiretroviral drugs patented there by multinationals on the ground that
they are not selling them at affordable prices."' 9 Merck announced that it
would offer to a number of countries its retroviral Sustiva and protease
inhibitor Crixivan for $500 and $600 per year, respectively.
The access campaign scored another important victory in 2001 by
pressuring Yale University, which holds the patent on the important
retroviral AIDS drug d4T, and requesting that Yale permit South Africa to
import generic versions of d4T. Yale's patent contract with Bristol-Myers
Squibb earns $40 million a year from the drug's licensing fees."° Initially,
Yale refused the request claiming that Bristol-Myers Squibb had an
exclusive license and that only the company could decide how to respond.
A group of Yale law students organized campus protests. One of the drug's
developers, Yale pharmacology professor William Prusoff, supported the
students. He said, "I wish they would either supply the drug free or allow
India or Brazil to produce it cheaply for underdeveloped countries. But the
problem is, the big drug houses are not altruistic organizations. Their only
purpose is to make money."'" On March 14, 2001, Bristol-Myers Squibb
announced that it would cut the cost of d4T to $0.15 for a daily dose (1.5%
of the cost to an American patient). In an editorial written by Dr. Prusoff
after the Bristol-Myers Squibb announcement, he cited the staggering
numbers of HIV afflicted people in sub-Saharan Africa and wrote, "The
numbers seem too great to understand. But they are not. In a way, they are
as easy to understand as 15 cents. I suppose this has now occurred to
Bristol-Myers Squibb." 2 He summarized the incident as follows: "I am
struck by all the steps that led us to today.... I find it hard to see any

78. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Africa.'s AIDS War, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2001, at Al.
79. Donald McNeil, Yale Pressed to Help Cut Drug Costs in Africa, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12,
2001, at A3.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. William Prusoff, The Scientist's Story, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2001, at A19.
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pattern in all this, perhaps that there is a moral urge among people that,
however coincidentally, can sometimes bring results." 3
The momentum generated by these developments accelerated into the
summer. At the behest of the group of African countries, the TRIPS
Council convened a special session on June 20, 2001, to address the access
to medicines issues and to listen to member delegations present their
positions. A building consensus emerged, which included the EU, that
TRIPS should not interfere with the protection of public health.
Nonetheless, the United States continued to defend its global drug
companies." Developing countries sought official confirmation that
measures to protect public health would not make them subject to dispute
settlement procedures in the WTO. The TRIPS Council resolved to
continue analyzing the degree of flexibility afforded by TRIPS in the
context of public health, planned future meetings on the issue, and pledged
to convene another special session on trade and pharmaceuticals in
September 2001.5 At the June meeting, the Brazilian delegation
highlighted Brazil's dramatically successful program of distributing
HIV/AIDS medicines at very low or no cost to patients. Its access to
medicines program has decreased AIDS-related deaths by half and reduced
hospital admissions brought on by opportunistic infections by 80%. Brazil
has become a beacon of hope to developing countries in their struggle
against the HIV/AIDS pandemic.
Brazil's successful AIDS programs, widely touted upon the heels of the
withdrawn South African lawsuit, made the United States's WTO case
against Brazil look increasingly unsavory. The United States announced
that it was officially withdrawing its case against Brazil on the first day of
the first U.N. General Assembly Special Session, which was devoted to a
public health issue (HIV/AIDS). The special session culminated in "The
Declaration of Commitment" on HIV/AIDS, June 27,2001 (Declaration). 6
Applauded by the access to essential medicines campaigners, such as the
MSF, the Declaration framed the issue as not merely medical but as a

83. Id.
84. See Sarah Boseley & Peter Capella, U.S. Defends Drug Companies, GUARDIAN OF
LONDON, June 21, 200 1, available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines01/062 1-01 .htm.
85. Gustavo Capdevila, WTO Concedes Developing World's Pleafor Access to Low-Cost
Drugs, DAWN: THE INTERNET EDITION, June 24, 2001, available at http://www.dawn.com/200 I/
06/24/intl 1.htm.
86. Declarationof Commitment on HIVIAIDS: GlobalCrisis-GlobaAction, U.N. GAOR,
26th Special Sess., June 25-27, 2001, available at http://www.un.org/ga/aids/coverage/Final
DeclarationHIVAIDS.html.
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"political, human rights, and economic threat."8 The Declaration
emphasized both prevention and treatment, and there was a call to generate
about $9 billion for a Global AIDS and Health fund that U.N. SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan hoped would be fully operational by the end of 2001.
Governance of the fund is bound to be controversial. NGO activists warn
that global pharmaceutical companies have conflicts of interest and should
not make spending decisions, whereas the industry insists upon a
substantial role in the fund. Nonetheless, while numerous controversies
remain, progress on the access campaign has come a long way even since
the beginning of 2001.
IV. CONCLUSION

What is new is that public health issues are finally becoming linked to
trade and IP. There is evidence of movement away from the industrysponsored IP orthodoxy that animated deliberations leading up to the
TRIPS accord. To the extent that public health activists are succeeding in
persuading others of this way of framing the issues, they could have a
significant impact indeed in redressing the imbalance between private and
public interests in the context of IP.
Overall, the post-TRIPS picture is mixed. TRIPS has energized the IP
industry to press further for TRIPS-plus policy changes in foreign
countries. The USTR has been busy promoting the industry's position, but
has been somewhat reined in by Clinton's executive order. TRIPS has
galvanized an increasingly vociferous and mobilized civil society
campaign to temper the previously unchecked industry dominance over the
IP agenda. At the very least, the post-TRIPS trends have revealed new
areas of contestation and portend a more difficult political environment for
the IP industry.
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